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1. Introduction
Innovation economics has been focused on business innovation as 
an economic growth driver. According to literature, the way inno-
vation and regional and national economic growth are connected is 
through the firms productivity increase (Färe, Grosskopf, Fukuyama, 
& Margaritis, 2011; Nelson, 1959), and therefore, one may think that 
regions and countries all around the world seek to maximize their 
R&D&i (Research, Development and Innovation) investments as a 
way to improve their productivity. However, it is possible to find in 
those countries substantial differences in the investment levels, espe-
cially in underdeveloped countries whose investments in R&D&i are 
less than low.
Some of the causes found in literature as an explanation of those 
differences between developed and underdeveloped economies are 
related to the existence of market failures. In the case of R&D&i ven-
tures, it seems to be more frequent and stronger than other types of 
ventures, like fixed capital investments (Hall & Lerner, 2009). In the 
first place, firms cannot privately appropriate all the benefits of their 
investments, given that knowledge generated inside the firm becomes 
a public good; that is, knowledge is a non-rival and non-exclusive 
asset. Therefore, even when there is a social expectation for more 
R&D&i private investment, firms face a disincentive to finance a pu-
blic good privately.
Secondly, information asymmetries in the case of R&D&i projects are 
strong; this market failure causes future expectations about the results 
of innovation projects to be uncertain, both for the company and for 
its potential external funders (Hall & Lerner, 2009). The latter means 
that R&D ventures are risky, and therefore, external financial costs 
are higher for these type of projects, then, companies investment le-
vel is lower than the socially desired one, since the private and social 
returns of this type of investments diverge (Arrow, 1972).
The fact that knowledge generated by firms on R&D&i projects be-
comes a public good is related to what is known in the literature as 
spillover effects. These effects, generally positive, can benefit firms 
that carry out R&D&i expenditures, their rivals, and in general, the 
market in which these companies are located (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & 
Henderson, 1993). In such a way, society wants private companies 
to invest in R&D&i projects to generate such spillover effects. Howe-
ver, as already anticipated, private firms will not be willing to finance 
the entirety of these investments. In this sense, public investment in 
R&D&i plays a preponderant role, since it is called to replace the lack 
of private investment funds as a way to generate the spillover effects 
sought by society (G. Crespi, Garone, Maffioli, & Melendez, 2015).
In order to encourage firms to invest in R&D&i, governments pro-
mote some policies focused on increasing the quantity and quality 
of projects; two of these incentives are tax deductions and business 
subsidies for carrying out R&D&i ventures. However, given that go-
vernments must prioritize their expenditures towards programs whe-
re more significant impacts are expected, the evaluation of the effects 
caused by such aids is fundamental, especially in underdeveloped 
countries, where budget deficits are substantial.
However, assessing the effect that public R&D&i policies have on 
private companies and the society is not an easy task, especially for 
policymakers, which most of the time have data restrictions related to 
the intangibility of the results of this type of ventures (David, Hall, & 
Toole, 2000). That is, in some cases, policymakers cannot even make 
measurements that allow them to understand if subsidies given to the 
private sector have generated some effect on firms and society.
In the last 30 years, innovation researchers have tried to measure 
spillover effects generated by public policies, especially in the case 
of business subsidies for carrying out R&D&i ventures. These effects 
are named additionality effects, and are generally grouped in three 
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different types of effects. First, input additionality, e.g. increase in pri-
vate R&D expenditure, employment increase, etc.; secondly, output 
additionality, e.g. increase of innovative products and services reve-
nues, propensity to register patents, etc.; and third, behavioral addi-
tionality e.g. propensity to innovate, effects on the number of aban-
doned or delayed innovation projects, etc. However, literature about 
subsidy effects has been largely focused on determining the effects of 
input additionality, but the other types of additionalities have been 
left aside, especially those related to the firm's behavior. 
It is essential to point out that when it comes to assess the effects of 
innovation subsidies, the temporality of the study is not a trivial mat-
ter, because additionality can occur in the short term, as it is the case 
of input additionality; e.g., a firm spends more on R&D as soon as 
it receives a public subsidy for innovation. However, it can also oc-
cur in the long term, as it is the case of output additionality; e.g., the 
company will achieve sales of innovative products once they carry 
out an innovation project and manage to convince the market of the 
advantages of their products and services. However, the last happens 
in the middle and long term, so it is essential to focus not only on 
the short but also in the long term (Zúñiga-Vicente, Alonso-Borrego, 
Forcadell, & Galán, 2014).
On the other hand, even though in the last 30 years, a genuine inter-
est has been generated in the evaluation of R&D&i policies through 
subsidies, the vast majority of these evaluations are carried out in 
developed countries. In the case of Latin American and developing 
countries, there is not a large number of studies, due in part to the 
fact that not all countries have the microdata needed to carry them 
out (innovation surveys based on the Oslo Manual). Similarly, in the 
vast majority of literature, studies focus on input additionality, speci-
fically in R&D expenditure, trying to determine if there is a crowding-
out effect between public subsidies and private spending on R&D&i 
(Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014) but letting behavioral and output addi-
tionality aside.
Within Latin American countries, Colombia stands out for its lack of 
investment in R&D&i; its total expenditure for 2017 raises to 0.24% 
of GDP, of which only 49% was financed with private resources. This 
shows there is a problem regarding the interest of private firms in 
carrying out this type of projects; however, it also shows that public 
resources, which finance 48% of the total investment (OCyT, 2017), 
should be prioritized for those projects having the most significant 
impacts, given that there are few resources to invest.
This study is carried out through a data panel of Colombian manu-
facturing companies between 2009 and 2016 generated through the 
Survey of Development and Technological Innovation (Encuesta de 
desarrollo tecnológico e innovación tecnológica-EDIT). This research 
aims to estimate the impact of innovation subsidies on input, output 
and behavioral additionality of Colombian companies in the long term.
The article is structured as follows: A brief literature review related 
to the evaluation of the innovation subsidies and methodologies 
that have been applied by researchers to solve some methodological 
issues. Afterwards, the methodology, data set, and variables used will 
be explained. In the fifth section, the results of an econometric stra-
tegy are presented, and in the final section will be the conclusions, 
discussion, and limitations of the study.
2. Literature review
In recent years, the literature on the effect that subsidies to innovation 
have on firms has grown exponentially. Generally, this literature has 
used innovation surveys based on the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) 
and has had to deal mainly with a problem of endogeneity, that is, 
subsidies are not given randomly, and therefore, they are determi-
ned by the same variables for which it is required to measure its rate 
of change before and after the subsidy (e.g. R&D expenditure). In 
such a way, multiple methodologies have been used to overcome this 
problem, e.g. the Heckman selection models, instrumental variables 
(IV), parametric matching, difference in differences (DID), and dose-
response models. Each of them has different approaches, but they 
have as a common factor that they try to overcome the problem of 
endogeneity, and in some cases, as with the DID methodology, hete-
rogeneity for not observable firm variables can also be controlled [for 
a thorough review of these methodologies see Cerulli (2010)].
The literature on the effect of subsidies on innovative firms began 
in the 2000s, seeking to determine if there was a crowding-out ef-
fect on the companies internal R&D expenditure. In general, these 
studies found this effect is positive, and firms receiving subsidies end 
up spending a higher amounts of R&D than they would have spent 
without the subsidy, that is, the so-called input additionality effect 
(Aerts & Czarnitzki, 2004; Aerts & Schmidt, 2008; Almus & Czarnitz-
ki, 2003; Busom, 2000; Cerulli & Potì, 2008, 2016; Choi & Lee, 2017; 
Chudnovsky, Lopez, Rossi, & Ubfal, 2006; Cin, Kim, & Vonortas, 
2017; Czarnitzki & Delanote, 2015; Czarnitzki, Ebersberger, & Fier, 
2007; Czarnitzki & Hussinger, 2018; Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento, 2012, 
2013, 2014; Engel, Rothgang, & Eckl, 2016; González & Pazó, 2008; 
Görg & Strobl, 2007; Heshmati & Lööf, 2005; Jiang et al., 2018; Lach, 
2002; Sanguinetti, 2005).
At the same time, it can be expected that the effects of innovation 
subsidies tend not to be exclusive for input additionality, but also on 
other types of variables such as behavioral ones. The idea behind the 
behavioral additionality is that a company, after receiving a subsidy, 
changes its behavior, it is managed under a new logic, and performs 
its innovation processes differently. Therefore, it is possible to measu-
re such changes before and after the subsidy. Authors such as Autio, 
Kanninen & Gustafsson (2008) have shown that the forms of lear-
ning-related with technology, market, and internationalization in-
crease positively after receiving a subsidy. Similarly, Clarysse, Wright, 
and Mustar (Clarysse, Wright, & Mustar, 2009) find that government 
subsidies have a substantial impact on the formalization of innova-
tion processes, in the generation of capabilities to manage innovation, 
and in the research trajectories of business. In the same path, Wan-
zenböck, Scherngell, and Fischer (2013) show that once companies 
receive subsidies to innovation, the likelihood of abandoning their in-
novation projects decreases, the cooperative behavior increases, and 
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the knowledge transfer flows become more visible. At the same time, 
Tello (2015), Busom and Vélez-Ospina (2017), and Jiang et al. (2018) 
show that companies receiving subsidies tend to increase their pro-
pensity to innovate. However, the literature on the effects of subsidies 
on behavioral additionality is not widely disseminated, and generally, 
literature about innovation subsidy focuses on the input additionali-
ties of innovation (Dimos & Pugh, 2016).
Simultaneously, the effects generated by subsidies could also be mea-
sured on innovative output results; that is, subsidies can also gene-
rate output additionalities. Some researchers have shown that these 
effects are highly visible, and therefore, they can be taken into account 
as a way to evaluate R&D&i government policies. In this direction, 
Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014) show that companies receiving 
subsidies have a higher propensity to register patents; these results 
are in line with those by Czarnitzki, Ebersberger and Fier (2007), 
Czarnitzki and Delanote (2015), Widmann (2016) and Czarnitzki 
and Hussinger (2018). Likewise, the articles by Crespi and Maffioli 
(2014), Crespi et al. (G. Crespi et al., 2015), and Cin, Kim, and Vo-
nortas (2017) show that firms in Latin America and Korea tend to 
improve their labor productivity after receiving an innovation subsi-
dy. In the case of Austria, García and Mohnen (2010) indicate that the 
proportion of innovative sales increases by 3,4% for firms obtaining 
an innovation subsidy. This is a significant additionality effect, given 
that it is assumed that one of the main objectives of subsidies is to re-
duce the uncertainty of innovation projects and generate profitability 
for the companies receiving them. In the end, this profitability must 
come from a higher flow of revenues. However, Karhunen and Huo-
vari (Karhunen & Huovari, 2015) show with data from Finland that 
labor productivity in SMEs seems not to be affected after a subsidy 
reception, even when this type of policies tends to increase the firms’ 
human capital levels; also, Catozzella and Vivarelli (2011) show with 
data from Italy that innovation productivity tends to be reduced after 
subsidy; this could be a result of the innovation cost increase, but also 
because of the decrease of innovation revenues.
Researches like Aboal and Garda (2015), Crespi et al. (G. Crespi et 
al., 2015), Bodas-Freitas et al.(2017), Guo, Guo and Jiang (2016), and 
Howell (2017) show that firms receiving subsidies tend to increase 
their sales of innovative products, not in the short term, but the long 
term. The last point is essential to determine the actual additionali-
ty effects of innovation subsidies. Innovation projects usually deliver 
results in the long term; however, a large part of research on this to-
pic focuses on short-term additionality effects, especially those that 
used propensity score matching methodologies (Zúñiga-Vicente et 
al., 2014). In recent years, literature has begun to show the long-term 
effect of subsidies by finding there are greater effects in the long term 
than those estimated in the short term (Bodas-Freitas et al., 2017; Cin et 
al., 2017; G. Crespi et al., 2015; Engel et al., 2016; Guo et al., 2016; Howell, 
2017; Karhunen & Huovari, 2015; Tello, 2015; Widmann, 2016).
Similarly, as evidenced by Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014), studies on the 
additionality of subsidies are mainly focused on developed countries 
and have not paid much attention to these effects on developing cou-
ntries. As we understand it, this fact has a fundamental justification, 
the lack of micro-data in which to look for evidence of additionalities 
in developing countries. Since the first decade of the 2000s, the exer-
cises carried out in Europe through the Community Innovation Sur-
veys (CIS) based on the Oslo Manual (OECD & Eurostat, 1997) have 
allowed the detailed study of this and other phenomena related to 
innovation. However, in the case of developing countries, the lack of 
micro-data has not allowed additionalities to be studied sequentially. 
However, it is possible to find some valuable examples for developing 
countries, especially in the case of Latin America as it can be seen in 
Sanguinetti (2005), Chudnovsky et al.(2006), and Crespi et al.(2016) 
for Argentina; Fernández-Sastre and Martín-Mayoral (2015) in the 
case of Ecuador; Tello (2015) for Peru; Aboal and Garda (2015) in 
Uruguay; Crespi et al.(G. Crespi et al., 2015), Busom and Vélez-Os-
pina (2017), and Barrios, Forero and Perry (2018) for the case of Co-
lombia, and the literature review of Crespi and Maffioli (2014) for all 
Latin America.Methodology
It is possible to see that literature about innovation subsidies addi-
tionalities has been overlooked; first, the effects of subsidies on other 
variables different from the ones measuring input additionalities. Se-
cond, the long-term effects of subsidies on firms. Third, the impact of 
innovation subsidies on firms of underdeveloped countries. In such a 
way, this research is a small effort to understand the long-term input, 
output, and behavioral additionality for manufacturing firms in an 
underdeveloped country like Colombia.
3. Methodology
The method used in this research is “Conditional Difference in Di-
fferences” (CDID). This method consists in combining a parametric 
matching methodology with a difference in difference model, where 
the average differences of the control and treatment group before the 
subsidy are compared against the same differences after the subsidy 
granted in the follow-up period.
For our data, we do not have a randomized experiment since subsi-
dies are not given randomly. Therefore, it is not possible to compare 
directly firms receiving subsidies against companies that do not recei-
ve them, because their initial and final conditions are differentiated by 
other factors different from subsidies. That is the reason why the first 
step of the CDID methodology is to use a matching method. With 
this technique, it is possible to identify a subsided company and their 
counterpart, i.e., another firm that does not receive subsidies, but 
with the same likelihood of receiving government aid, and therefore, 
with similar characteristics compared with a subsided firm before re-
ceiving grants. This is done through a set of observable firm characte-
ristics. This pairing method, called propensity score matching (PSM), 
allows us to return to the conditions of a randomized experiment 
(Chudnovsky et al., 2006) in which the results of input, output, and 
behavioral variables are compared in the base year (2010). The PSM 
consists of determining the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATET):
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(1)  ATET = E(Yi1|Di  = 1) − E (Yi0|Di = 1)
Where Di is a dichotomous variable with the value one (1) if the firm 
received subsidies, and zero (0) otherwise. Yi1 is the response variable 
being measured for firms with a subsidy, i.e., in the treatment group, 
and Yi0 is the response variable being measured for firms without 
subsidy, i.e., in the control group. In the case of innovation subsidies, 
response variables could be grouped on input, output and behavioral 
variables.
The term E(Yi1 |D i= 1) indicates the average effect of the response 
variable Yi for a company in the treatment group and receiving sub-
sidies, and E(Yi0 |Di = 1) reflects the average effect of the response 
variable for a company in the control group and receiving subsidies. 
However, the last term is not observable and is counterfactual, since 
the effect of the subsidy cannot be seen in a company that did not 
receive it; therefore, this value must be estimated. 
Assuming a CIA (Conditional Independence Assumption) between 
subsidies and the response variable, a set of observable characteristics 
Xi, used to select granted firms could be applied to determine the 
outcomes of non-treated (control) firms. Therefore, it can be said that:
(2) E(Yi0 |Xi,Di = 1) = E(Yi0 |Xi,Di = 0)
That is, it can be assumed that taking into account the set Xi of varia-
bles, the expected value of Yi for companies belonging to the control 
group and receiving subsidies (counterfactual) must be identical to 
the non-observable value of variables in control group not receiving 
subsidies. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) addressed this issue, de-
monstrating that, if CIA is valid, this problem is facilitated by redu-
cing the set of variables Xi in a single index, called propensity score, 
as long as it is consistently estimated by a parametric model, in this 
case, a probit model:
(3) Pr(Di = 1| Xi) = F(Xi )= ∫
The probit model result is the estimated likelihood of a firm to be 
granted by government subsidies, and it is used to match treated and 
control firms. Keeping this in mind, the calculation of ATET will be:
(4) ATET = E(Yi1|Xi,Di = 1)-E(Yi0|Xi,Di = 0)
However, given that we want to determine the long-term effect of 
subsidies using panel data, the way to implement this methodology is 
through a DID procedure:
(5) ATETt = E(Yi1t|Xit-1,Dit = 1,Dit-1=0)−E(Yi0t|Xit-1,Dit=0, Dit-1=0))
The explained methodology allows us to control by observed hetero-
geneity and counterfactuality through the matching procedure; at the 
same time, the use of a DID procedure allows us to control by non-
observable invariant firm characteristics (Aerts & Schmidt, 2008). 
The CDID procedure was developed with the methodology proposed 
by Villa (2016)I present the features of the user-written command 
diff, which estimates difference-in-differences (DID.
4.1. Data
The data set used for this study was developed by the National Ad-
ministrative Department of Statistics (DANE, for its acronym in 
Spanish) in the Survey of Development and Technological Innova-
tion (Encuesta de desarrollo tecnológico e innovación tecnológi-
ca [EDIT]). EDIT is a biennial survey, and we use EDIT V (2009 – 
2010), EDIT VI (2011 – 2012), EDIT VII (2013 – 2014), and EDIT 
VIII (2015-2016). The survey follows the methodology of the Oslo 
Manual (OECD, 2005) and Bogotá’s Manual (Jaramillo, Lugones, & 
Salazar, 2000) to collect firm-level characteristics like the amount of 
R&D expenditures, cooperation activities, R&D labor, among others. 
This survey was developed for manufacturing firms, and it is statisti-
cally representative at a national level.
The variables used are divided into four groups. The first one is the 
group used to generate our propensity score using a probit model. 
The second group of variables is the one measuring input additionali-
ties of firms. The third group measures behavioral additionalities. The 
last one measures output additionalities. Description of variables can 
be seen in Appendix A.
We use the 2010 survey as our base treatment moment and 2016 as 
the follow-up year. The objective behind this was to measure long-
term additionalities of firms receiving subsidies. We use firms with 
more than ten employees and not receiving subsidies in the period 
2008-2009. At the same time, we divided our firms into SMEs and big 
firms to confirm if the additionalities affect in different ways those ty-
pes of firms; A summary of our data used can be seen in Appendix B.
4. Results
To perform our matching methodology, we use a probit model in 
which variables related to subsidies granting are included (see Appen-
dix A). This regression was performed for firms of the 2010 survey. 
Results of this model are posted in Table 1.
Table 1 Probit model regression
Probit model for companies with more than ten employees. Survey 2010. 
Firms are not receiving subsidies in 2008-2009.
  Coef. P>|Z| Std. error
lnsize 0,274 0,001*** 0,085
medium_tech 0,332 0,237 0,281
medhigh_tech 0,566 0,026** 0,255
high_tech 0,570 0,157 0,403
and_reg 5,101 0,000*** 0,520
bog_reg 5,127 0,000*** 0,525
_cons -8,627    
Number of observations: 736
Prob> chi2=0,000
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Source: Our own calculations.
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Variables like firm size, belonging to medium-high technology indus-
tries, and firm location in principal geographic areas like Bogotá 
and Andean Region seem to be related to subsidies in Colombia. 
After this procedure, we perform several t-tests on the equality 
of means of Appendix A variables related to input, output, and 
behavioral additionalities. The result of these tests can be seen in 
Table 2. Before the matching procedure, control firms tend to have 
a higher number of employees and belong in more significant pro-
portions to high and medium technology sectors. However, after 
the matching procedure, differences disappear, and therefore, we 
are ready to perform a difference in difference procedure given 
that control and treated firms seem to have no differences. In ap-
pendix C. we have included a common support analysis in order 
to understand if, after matching, the balancing property is satis-
fied. As the reader may appreciate, after the fourth block, we reach 
the balancing property using 736 firms; therefore, we can now the 
average treated effect on the treated using the difference in difference 
procedure.
Table 2. T-test on equality of means. Treated Vs. control firms in 2010 survey
T-Test for treated and control firms before and after the balance
All firms with more than ten employees. Survey 2009-2010. Firms’ non-










lnsize -0,886 0,004*** -0,053 0,603
medium_tech -0,003 0,974 -0,044 0,137
medhigh_tech -0,187 0,055* -0,058 0,103
high_tech -0,031 0,646 -0,005 0,827
and_reg -0,113 0,327 0,051 0,165
bog_reg -0,110 0,339 0,058 0,111
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Treated firms 21. Control firms 715. Total firms 736.
Source: Own calculations
We calculate ATET with 2010 as our base period and 2016 as our 
follow-up period. Results of this procedure can be seen in Table 3.
Table 3. Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). All firms included.
Difference in differences procedure for all firms in the sample. Firms with more than ten employees. Base period=2010; Follow up period=2016
Type of additionality Variable
base period diff  
(treated - control)
follow-up period diff ( 
treated - control)
diff in diff  
(Follow up - Base period)
P>| t |
input
rdint -0,746 0,445 1,191 0,000***
rdext 0,289 0,004 -0,285 0,001***
expinn -0,457 0,449 0,906 0,012***
rd_size -10,667 16,691 9,896 0,006***
behavioral
ongoing 0,012 -0,055 -0,068 0,249
imp_fin_internal -0,005 0,080 0,085 0,150
imp_innprofit -0,085 -0,153 -0,068 0,249
imp_fin_ext 0,174 0,206 0,031 0,585
coop_total 0,217 0,221 0,005 0,929
coop_amplitude 1,263 0,653 -0,610 0,016**
output
dummypatents -0,086 -0,050 0,036 0,125
tmarks_ip -0,047 -0,026 0,021 0,718
nfnatsales 0,220 0,086 -0.135 0,021**
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Number of observations in the base period 736 (21 treated, 715 controls); the number of observations in follow up period 522 (39 treated, 483 controls).
Source: Own calculations.
It can be seen that when we included all firms in our analysis, input 
additionalities tend to be strong. Differences in internal R&D expen-
ditures move from being negative in favor of non-subsided control 
firms to being positive in favor of treated firms for almost 1.2 million 
COP. Therefore, we can discard a crowding-out effect related to inter-
nal R&D. However, external expenditures on R&D move in the other 
direction. In 2010, treated firms expended more than control firms did, 
but in 2016, this situation reversed. It seems that subsided firms tend to 
diminish their external expenditure. Apparently, in the long term, firms 
tend to privilege the internal formation of capabilities and diminish 
external knowledge acquisition. This is, in the long term, com-
panies tend to generate its knowledge in house, instead of bu-
ying it. The sum of total R&D and innovation seems to increase as a 
result of a higher effect of internal R&D in almost 0,9 million COP. Em-
ployees related to R&D in 2010 were higher for control firms; howe-
ver, after subsidies, treated firms tended to have almost ten more 
employees than non-subsidized control firms. This is important given 
that we assume these types of employees have high qualifications. The-
refore, innovation subsidies create high-value employment. 
Results for behavioral additionalities are no good. Treated firms do not 
elevate the number of ongoing projects and do not improve their per-
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ception of innovation barriers. However, treated firms diminish their 
cooperation amplitude; that is, these firms tend to collaborate with fewer 
types of institutions. We interpreted these results as a cooperation spe-
cialization, i.e., firms tend to privilege relationships with fewer types of 
institutions but might be increasing the strength of those relationships.
Output results show that patents and trademarks have no effects when 
the full sample is used. Innovation revenues, on the other side, seem 
to have negative additionalities, that is, differences of control and treated 
firms tend to decrease in the long run in favor of control firms. Given 
that we are using only revenues for new to the firm products and services 
as a way to measure innovation output, we believe this result could be an 
outcome of a dichotomy between new to the market revenues and new to 
the firm revenues. Our sales variable was constructed using a percentage 
of total new to the firm innovative revenues, and then we re-expressed 
this number into a dummy variable. It is possible that the percentage of 
new to the market revenues increases while the complement percentage 
of new to the firm revenues decreases. Maybe, the negative sign of our 
sales variable could be the result of non-observed additionality on new 
to the market innovative revenues. However, we cannot confirm this as 
we do not have enough observations for new to the market revenues. 
Another plausible explanation of the negative sign could be the low effi-
ciency of externally funded innovation expenditures against private fun-
ding expenditure as it was founded by Catozzella and Vivarelli (2011).
4.2. Results on small and medium enterprises
When the procedure is developed for SMEs, the results are quite in-
teresting and can be seen in Table 4. In the first place, SMEs present 
a significant crowding-out effect for internal R&D expenditure. That 
is, SMEs tend to expend less money on internal R&D after subsidies. 
This result is contrary to the one obtained when we used the full 
sample; this is interesting since we can say not all firms tend to act 
in the same way after subsidies. At the same time, SMEs tend to ex-
pend more money on external R&D acquisition; therefore, we can say 
these firms tend to privilege external over internal knowledge after 
subsidies. When we measure the effect over total R&D, the decrea-
sing effect of external knowledge acquisition is higher than the one of 
internal R&D. Therefore, there is a crowding-out effect on total R&D 
expenditure. Simultaneously, R&D employment tends to increase for 
subsided SMEs; on average, in the long term, subsided SMEs augmen-
ted R&D employees more than the control SMEs in 4,3 employees.
Regarding behavioral additionalities, results are interesting, too. Ongoing 
innovation projects tend to increase for SMEs after subsidy; that is, firms 
with an active project in the survey period are 21% higher for subsided 
against control companies. Impediments regarding internal and external 
funding tend to increase for treated firms also; this seems to be a nega-
tive result given that firms tend to perceive more financial barriers after 
than before subsidy. However, we have a plausible explanation for this 
result; in several researches like the ones of Baldwin and Lin (2002), 
D’Este, Iammarino, Savona and Von Tunzelmann (2012) or Pellegri-
no and Savona (2017), it has been found that some financial impe-
diments tend to increase after a firm generates some experience on 
innovation ventures. The reason behind this is there are some firms 
without innovation projects, which tend to respond “no” to the ques-
tion: Does your firm perceive a financial impediment to perform in-
novative projects in the last year? because they have no experience in 
day-by-day innovation projects. However, firms tend to have a higher 
perception of impediments after they involve on more R&D ventu-
res because they begin to understand the way innovation is made. 
Overall, we consider this result can be a signal of firms gathering 
experience on innovation projects; therefore, we hypothesize it is an 
experience effect that could not be possible if these firms did not re-
ceive subsidies. At the same time, the perception that innovation has 
not been profitable tends to decrease, and we believe this is also an 
experience effect created by the possibility to involve in R&D ventures 
after receiving subsidies. On the other side, we do not find any changes 
in cooperation variables or innovation output variables.
Table 4. Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). SME’s.
Difference in differences procedure for SME’s. Firms with more than ten and less than 200 employees. Base period=2010; Follow up period=2016
Type of additionality Variable base period diff  (treated - control)
follow-up period diff  
(treated - control)
diff in diff  
(Follow up - Base period) P>| t |
input
rdint 0,064 -0,007 -0,071 0,000***
rdext -0,003 0,003 0,005 0,008***
expinn 0,061 -0,005 -0,066 0,000***
rd_size -0,426 3,850 4,276 0,001***
behavioral
ongoing -0,103 0,111 0,214 0,008***
imp_fin_internal -0,314 -0,018 0,296 0,000***
imp_innprofit 0,165 -0,022 -0,187 0,019**
imp_fin_ext -0,260 0,077 0,338 0,000***
coop_total 0,383 0,358 -0,025 0,729
coop_amplitude 1,237 0,888 -0,349 0,162
output
dummypatents -0,011 0,074 0,085 0,003
tmarks_ip -0,158 0,162 -0,004 0,962
nfnatsales 0,245 0,213 -0,031 0,686
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Number of observations in the base period 448 (8 treated, 440 controls); the number of observations in follow up period 254 (12 treated, 242 controls).
Source: Own calculations
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4.3. Results on big firms
As can be seen in Table 5, big firms treated tend to have more R&D in-
ternal expenditures than control firms do in the long term; therefore, 
we can say big firms in Colombia behave differently than SMEs, given 
that for the latter we found a crowding-out effect. At the same time, 
expenditures for acquiring external R&D tend to decrease in those 
types of firms. It seems that treated big firms tend to replace external 
by the internal generation of knowledge. At the same time, total ex-
penditure seems to have no changes in the long term and in sum, it 
seems that the additionality of internal expenditure is controlled by 
the additionality of external expenditures on R&D.
When we break down results of behavioral additionalities, it can be 
seen that treated firms having ongoing innovation projects seem to 
diminish against non-treated control firms; this could be interpreted 
as a counterintuitive result, but it is also possible that big firms tend 
to choose those projects in which they expect higher profits or those 
for which they have enough funding, diminishing ongoing projects 
in consequence. However, this result is to be researched in the future. 
By combining results of internal R&D expenditure with those of the 
dummy of ongoing projects, we can expect that individual projects of 
big firms tend to be highly specialized and to have higher amounts 
of money.
Table 5. Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). Big firms.
Difference in differences procedure for big firms. Firms with more than 200 employees. Base period=2010; Follow up period=2016
Type of additionality Variable base period diff  (treated - control)
follow-up period diff 
(treated - control)
diff in diff  
(Follow up - Base period) P>| t |
input
rdint -0,148 0,608 0,756 0,095*
rdext 0,701 0,005 -0,696 0,000***
expinn 0,553 0,613 0,060 0,907
rd_size -30,045 -9,088 20,957 0,005***
behavioral
ongoing 0,032 -0,195 -0,227 0,018**
imp_fin_internal 0,186 0,183 -0,003 0,976
imp_innprofit -0,165 -0,285 -0,120 0,224
imp_fin_ext 0,463 0,294 -0,169 0,075*
coop_total 0,166 0,056 -0,11 0,223
coop_amplitude 1,678 0,480 -1,198 0,010**
output dummypatents -0,069 -0,066 0,003 0,924
tmarks_ip -0,023 -0,064 -0,041 0,664
  nfnatsales 0,215 0,024 -0,191 0,058*
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Number of observations in the base period 257 (13 treated, 244 controls); the number of observations in follow up period 177 (27 treated, 150 controls).
Source: Own calculations
Regarding external financial impediments, big firms tend to percei-
ve fewer barriers after subsidy; this is contrary to what happens with 
SMEs. We believe big firms have already experienced innovation pro-
jects; therefore, those firms tend to decrease external financial im-
pediments as a result of a positive innovation subsidy spillover. At 
the same time, cooperation amplitude is lower for big firms receiving 
subsidies; our interpretation of this result is that those firms tend to 
specialize their cooperation networks going from an atomized net-
work to a specialized one.
Finally, results of output additionalities show us that big firms, just 
like SMEs do not have more patents or trademarks after subsidies, 
at the same time, and in the same direction of the results of the 
full sample, innovative revenues tend to decrease as firms receive 
more subsidies; we do not fully understand this results, but the same 
hypothesis posted for the full sample could apply in the case of big 
firms.
5. Robustness check
Lastly, as a robustness check, we perform several falsification tests for 
the period 2010. Let´s remember that for our analysis, we use com-
panies without subsidies in the period 2007-2008; therefore, we re-
plicate our matching procedure for the 2008 survey and then, we test 
the impact of subsidies on several variables for the follow-up period 
of 2010. Given that in our sample, we have companies not receiving 
subsidies in the 2007-2008 period, firms should not display any effect 
linked to subsidies in the period 2010. 
For our test we use variables like industrial secret (ind_sec, a dummy 
variable equal to one if the company protect its ideas with this type 
of protection and zero otherwise); non-disclosure agreements (non_
disa, a dummy variable equal to one if the company protect its ideas 
with this type of protection and zero otherwise); number of quality 
certifications obtained by the company in this period (cert_num); a 
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variable taking into account if the company is using data from re-
search centers or commerce chambers to generate innovation ideas 
(data_rcts; data_cc); and lastly, a dummy variable taking into account 
if the company perform innovation to improve quality of its goods 
and services (imp_gs). The selection of these variables lies in the fact 
that are measures that should not be affected by subsidies reception, 
and, as can be seen in appendix D., the checks confirm our inferences, 
the variables studied are not affected by subsidies in 2010.
6. Conclusions
We developed a Conditional Difference in Difference methodology 
to determine the input, output, and behavioral additionality effects of 
subsidies to innovation for firms in Colombia, in the 2010-2016 pe-
riod, using Colombia´s innovation survey (EDIT). Our results rein-
force the fact that innovation subsidies create positive additionalities 
on firms. Those additionalities can be seen in the long term, especially 
for input variables like internal R&D expenditures (rdint), total R&D 
expenditures (expinn), and the number of R&D employees (rd_size). 
On the other hand, we found that external expenditures on R&D 
(rdext) tend to be reduced after subsidies, and we believe this is an 
effect of internal knowledge generation against external acquisitions. 
This effect is visible especially, for big firms and the complete sample, 
and reinforces the fact that governments can reduce market imperfec-
tions using subsidies, given that most of the companies, tend to pri-
vilege the internal knowledge formation that generates internal spi-
llover effects. For manager proposes, these results are essential. Also, 
companies without experience in the innovation field, can use gover-
nment subsidies as a way to gain the initial needed capabilities in the 
process, even when this knowledge is obtained outside the company.
We found that behavioral additionalities are positive in the case of 
small and medium firms; these companies tend to increase the num-
ber of ongoing innovation projects showing that government subsi-
dies induce companies to involve into innovation in the long-term. At 
the same time, we found out that the perception of internal and ex-
ternal financial impediments tend to increase after subsidies in SMEs. 
These results seem to be contra-intuitive, because one may think that 
firms should reduce their financial impediments perception once 
subsidies are granted; however, we hypothesize that most SMEs are 
not experienced in innovation; therefore, this is the result of a new 
vision of these firms about the innovation process. As is discussed 
in literature (Baldwin & Lin, 2002; D’Este et al., 2012; Pellegrino & 
Savona, 2017), we call this phenomena the experience effect; compa-
nies perceive impediments to innovation only after the involvement 
on innovation process, therefore, subsidies increase impediments 
perception given that before grants, SMEs are mostly not involved 
in innovation ventures. At the same time, another way to see this ex-
perience effect is that SMEs tend to perceive that innovation is more 
profitable once they receive subsidies. A company cannot say that in-
novation is good business without performing innovation projects, 
and only after the reception of subsidies, followed by involvement in 
innovation projects, companies perceive the benefits of the process.
On the other side, we find out that big firms, after subsidy grants, 
tend to diminish their perception of external financial barriers (imp_
fin_ext). In contrast to SMEs findings, it seems that big firms, that are 
experienced already, find relief in their financial impediments per-
ception; This could be a proof for the experience effect generated in 
SMEs, given that is logic to think that big firms are already involved 
in innovation projects, and therefore, have lived in firsthand the effect 
of financial impediments, so subsidies, create the expected effect on 
big firms, diminishing obstacle´s perception.
Output additionalities do not have positive results in our research. 
Patents and trademarks are not affected after subsidies; however, we 
found a negative impact on firm revenues only for big firms. Although 
we do not fully understand this phenomenon, we believe this could be 
caused by the way we measure revenues (new to the firm), and possi-
bly, is non-observed additionality on new to the market revenues, that 
is, the weighted complement of our measure. The fact that we cannot 
find any output additionalities lead us to look for other ways to mea-
sure these type of impacts, and the CDM model (Crepon, Duguet, & 
Mairessec, 1998), could be a right approach in the case of productivity 
increase related to subsidies, even when recent literature point out to 
a negative result in this field (Czarnitzki & Delanote, 2017).
Our results have important messages for policymakers. For one side, in 
contrast to big firms, SMEs in Colombia seem to have stable additionalities 
produced by subsidies. Therefore, policies to innovation should privilege 
the selection of SMEs that most of the time are not involved in innovation, 
given that subsidies introduce an experience effect, making companies get 
involved in innovation ventures. However, must of the time, innovation 
policies are directed to big firms given the logic of “picking the winner” 
used by governments around the world. Our results point out that this 
type of policy should produce minor effects on market spillovers. 
Second, dividing our sample, we found out that big firms and SMEs 
tend to behave differently after subsidies; therefore, policymakers 
should avoid programs in which all companies are considered under 
the same umbrella. If behavior after subsidy is dissimilar, program 
characteristics should be also different in order to increase the like-
lihood of obtaining innovation spillover in each type of company, in 
this case, SMEs and big firms.  
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Appendix A. Summary of used variables
Variable Description Measurement
Probit
treated The firm receives subsidies in that particular year. Dummy 1=yes; 0=no
lnsize Number of employees Natural logarithm of employee’s number
medium_tech Belonging to a medium technology sector Dummy 1=yes; 0=no
medhigh_tech Belonging to a medium high technology sector Dummy 1=yes; 0=no
high_tech Belonging to a high technology sector Dummy 1=yes; 0=no
and_reg Firm located in Andean Region Dummy 1=yes; 0=no
bog_reg Firm located on Bogotá Dummy 1=yes; 0=no
Input
rdint Mean of internal expenditure on R&D in t and t-1 Millions of COP$
rdext Mean of external expenditure on R&D in t and t-1 Millions of COP$
expinn Mean of total expenditure on R&D in t and t-1 Millions of COP$
rd_size Mean of FTE R&D employees Number of employees
Behavioral
ongoing Does the firm have ongoing R&D projects? Dummy 1=yes; 0=no
imp_fin_intl Does the firm perceive a lack of internal financial founds? Dummy 1=yes; 0=no
imp_innprofit Does the firm perceive that innovation is not profitable? Dummy 1=yes; 0=no
imp_fin_ext Does the firm perceive a lack of external financial founds? Dummy 1=yes; 0=no
coop_total Does the firm cooperate for R&D in the last two years? Dummy 1=yes; 0=no
coop_amplitude Types of institutions in which cooperation is carried out Number of typologies, max=11
Output
dummypatents Does the firm have patents? Dummy 1=yes; 0=no
tmarks_ip Does the firm have trademarks? Dummy 1=yes; 0=no
nfnatsales Does the firm have innovative new for the firm national revenues? Dummy 1=yes; 0=no
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2019. Volume 14, Issue 4
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://jotmi.org)
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios. 170
Appendix B. Descriptive statistics
2010 survey
Subsidy? not treated treated
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Probit
treated 715 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 21 1,00 0,00 1,00 1,00
lnsize 715 4,83 1,25 2,44 8,27 21 5,71 1,38 2,94 7,44
medium_tech 715 0,24 0,42 0,00 1,00 21 0,24 0,44 0,00 1,00
medhigh_tech 715 0,24 0,43 0,00 1,00 21 0,43 0,51 0,00 1,00
high_tech 715 0,06 0,25 0,00 1,00 21 0,10 0,30 0,00 1,00
and_reg 715 0,46 0,50 0,00 1,00 21 0,57 0,51 0,00 1,00
bog_reg 715 0,32 0,47 0,00 1,00 21 0,43 0,51 0,00 1,00
Input
rdint 715 0,15 1,18 0,00 27,91 21 0,56 0,92 0,00 3,16
rdext 715 0,03 0,27 0,00 4,69 21 0,55 1,34 0,00 4,39
expinn 715 0,18 1,35 0,00 32,26 21 1,12 1,76 0,00 4,68
rd_size 715 15,02 44,50 0,00 892,00 21 18,12 20,32 0,50 61,00
Behavioral
ongoing 715 0,63 0,48 0,00 1,00 21 0,67 0,48 0,00 1,00
imp_fin_intl 715 0,41 0,49 0,00 1,00 21 0,38 0,50 0,00 1,00
imp_innprofit 715 0,44 0,50 0,00 1,00 21 0,38 0,50 0,00 1,00
imp_fin_ext 715 0,33 0,47 0,00 1,00 21 0,48 0,51 0,00 1,00
coop_total 715 0,57 0,50 0,00 1,00 21 0,86 0,36 0,00 1,00
coop_ampli~e 715 1,49 1,87 0,00 11,00 21 3,10 2,23 0,00 8,00
Output
dummypatents 715 0,03 0,17 0,00 1,00 21 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
tmarks_ip 715 0,50 0,50 0,00 1,00 21 0,52 0,51 0,00 1,00
nfnatsales 715 0,39 0,49 0,00 1,00 21 0,57 0,51 0,00 1,00
2016 survey
Subsidy? not treated treated
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Probit
treated 483 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 39 1,00 0,00 1,00 1,00
lnsize 483 5,10 1,31 2,44 8,35 39 5,43 1,45 3,18 8,43
medium_tech 483 0,18 0,38 0,00 1,00 39 0,28 0,46 0,00 1,00
medhigh_tech 483 0,24 0,43 0,00 1,00 39 0,32 0,48 0,00 1,00
high_tech 483 0,06 0,25 0,00 1,00 39 0,04 0,20 0,00 1,00
and_reg 483 0,46 0,50 0,00 1,00 39 0,64 0,49 0,00 1,00
bog_reg 483 0,34 0,47 0,00 1,00 39 0,28 0,46 0,00 1,00
Input
rdint 483 0,48 5,01 0,00 115,30 39 1,50 3,38 0,00 12,23
rdext 483 0,03 0,17 0,00 3,03 39 0,04 0,06 0,00 0,19
expinn 483 0,50 5,06 0,00 116,21 39 1,54 3,41 0,00 12,37
rd_size 483 16,29 27,44 0,50 252,00 39 27,30 32,25 3,00 117,50
Behavioral
ongoing 483 0,51 0,50 0,00 1,00 39 0,68 0,48 0,00 1,00
imp_fin_intl 483 0,21 0,41 0,00 1,00 39 0,24 0,44 0,00 1,00
imp_innprofit 483 0,14 0,35 0,00 1,00 39 0,16 0,37 0,00 1,00
imp_fin_ext 483 0,14 0,35 0,00 1,00 39 0,16 0,37 0,00 1,00
coop_total 483 0,43 0,50 0,00 1,00 39 0,56 0,51 0,00 1,00
coop_amplitude 483 1,17 1,70 0,00 8,00 39 2,52 3,07 0,00 11,00
Output
dummypatents 483 0,04 0,21 0,00 1,00 39 0,16 0,37 0,00 1,00
tmarks_ip 483 0,69 0,46 0,00 1,00 39 0,84 0,37 0,00 1,00
nfnatsales 483 0,53 0,50 0,00 1,00 39 0,56 0,51 0,00 1,00
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Appendix C. Common support analysis
lnsize medium_tech medhigh_tech high_tech and_reg bog_reg
Variable C T C T C T C T C T C T
Block 1
obs 687 14 687 14 687 14 687 14 687 14 687 14
mean 4,74 4,90 0,24 0,21 0,22 0,29 0,06 0,14 0,45 0,57 0,32 0,43
diff -0,16 0,03 -0,07 -0,08 -0,12 -0,11
p value 0,63 0,81 0,56 0,24 0,38 0,37
Block 2
obs 20 1 20 1 20 1 20 1 20 1 20 1
mean 6,45 7,43 0,05 1,00 0,85 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,60 1,00 0,40 0,00
diff -0,98 -0,95 0,85 0,00 -0,40 0,40
p value . . . . . .
Block 3
obs 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
mean 6,84 7,19 0,14 0,33 0,57 0,66 0,29 0,00 0,57 0,00 0,43 1,00
diff -0,35 -0,19 -0,09 0,29 0,57 -0,57
p value 0,20 0,54 0,81 0,36 0,11 0,11
Block 4
obs 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
mean 7,72 7,39 0,00 0,00 1 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
diff 0,33 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
p value . . . . . .
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
T=Treated; C=Control. N=736 firms
After block 4, there are no controls. For single observations, there are no Standard Deviations; therefore, we cannot calculate
P.Values for blocks 2 and 4.
Appendix D. Falsification tests
Falsification test.  
Difference in differences procedure for firms with more than ten employees and receiving subsidy in 2010. 
Base period=2008; Follow up period=2010
Type of additionality Variable
base period diff  
(treated - control)
follow-up period diff 
(treated - control)
diff in diff (Follow up - 
Base period)
P>| t |
Not related with subsidies
ind_sec -0,078 -0,122 -0,044 0,309
non_da -0,111 -0,097 0,014 0,804
cert_num -3,334 -1,482 1,852 0,605
data_rcts -0,097 -0,094 0,003 0,936
data_cc -0,007 -0,003 0,004 0,521
imp_gs 0,105 0,079 -0,026 0,694
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Number of observations in the base period 454 (12 treated, 442 controls); the number of observations in follow up period 259 (14 treated, 245 controls).
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